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1. We began our work by developing an automatic ground collision avoidance
system (GCAS) for fighters
• Completed research in 2011
• Fielded in the USAF F-16 fleet 2014-15 / Fielded in the F-35 fleetlate-2019
• Credited with 9 life saves in the field to date
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Resilient Autonomy
1. We began our work by developing an automatic ground collision avoidance
system (GCAS) for fighters
• Research began in the mid-1980’s
• Completed research in 2011 & fielded in the USAF F-16 fleet 2014-15
• Credited with 9 life saves in the field to date
2. Then expanded GCAS capability to easily adapt it to any vehicle type by
restructuring the software
• 2012 to 2017
• Began collaboration with FAA for insertion into general aviation and small UAVs
3. Expanded towards Greater Autonomy on sUAV under NASA’s UTM & SASO
• 2015 through 2017
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Broadening the Scope of Automatic Safety
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1. We began our work by developing an automatic ground collision avoidance
system (GCAS) for fighters
• Completed research in 2011
• Fielded in the USAF F-16 fleet 2014-15 / Fielded in the F-35 fleetlate-2019
• Credited with 9 life saves in the field to date
2. Then expanded GCAS capability to easily adapt it to any vehicle type by
restructuring the software
• 2012 to 2017
• Began collaboration with FAA for insertion into general aviation and small UAVs
3. Expanded towards Greater Autonomy on sUAV under NASA’s UTM & SASO
• 2015 through 2017
• Waypoint Following, GCAS, GeoFence, Forced Landing System (Sully/HudsonRiver)
• How to coordinate command/control of the vehicle: a multi-monitor run-time assurance architecture
• First phase of expandable variable-autonomy architecture (EVAA)
• Unique part of this research: The Moral Compass & Rules of Behavior
• When Safety should take priority over the mission & when protecting human life should take priority over vehicle safety
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2. Then expanded GCAS capability to easily adapt it to any vehicle type by
restructuring the software
• 2012 to 2017
• Began collaboration with FAA for insertion into general aviation and small UAVs
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Resilient Autonomy
4. The FAA Heard of this work: “Eureka, You have found the golden ring for
certifying autonomy”
• ASTM working group was established to capture EVAA concept
• Industry Standard was published October 2017 https://www.astm.org/Standards/F3269.htm
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https://www.astm.org/Standards/F3269.htm
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Leveraging the ASTM Standard
Leveraged Implementation
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• Understanding the different aircraft safety  
concerns and their connection to piloting tasks.
• Decomposition of piloting tasks with emphasis on
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